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1 Introduction
Does the Nuffield report Public Health: Ethical issues
1 neglect non-governmental
organisations (NGOs)? I think the answer has to be “yes” and in this article I set about
explaining why I take this view and what might be done to fill the gap. The Nuffield report,
to be fair, is not entirely silent on NGOs: it refers to them in its discussion of  “third
parties”, noting that all such parties have an “obligation to reflect on their role in public
health”.2 In total, however, there are just two paragraphs on NGOs (commercial
organisations, another of  Nuffield’s third parties, are discussed at much greater length).
These paragraphs describe NGOs as “important stakeholders”. More particularly, they note
that “whether [NGOs] are ‘grass roots’ or established national or multinational
organisations”, they can have a “valuable role to play in policy development”. There is also
a caution, however: “it should be borne in mind that NGOs may have a vested interest, a
commercial imperative and a ‘product’ in a way that is not dissimilar to a business”.3
Two paragraphs on NGOs may seem more than enough. This, after all, is a report about
the state – at core, its argument is that the state needs to adopt what it calls a “stewardship
model” in the arena of  public health.4 Thus it may be said that there was no reason for
extended engagement with NGOs or, for that matter, with any other non-state actor. I take
a different view, however. There are, of  course, issues and instances when it is important to
keep state and non-state separate; at the same time, however, I believe that being rigid about
the distinction is likely to obscure one of  the defining features of  public health today:
namely, the role of  non-state actors, including the ways in which such actors work with,
within and against the state, and at times as – or instead of  – it. I believe, in other words,
* School of  Law, University of  Nottingham. My thanks to Mark Flear, the editor of  this special issue, and to
both Noel Whitty and the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version. 
1 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007),
available at www.nuffieldbioethics.org/public-health (accessed 1 September 2011) (hereafter Nuffield report).
2 Ibid. para. 2.46. In similar vein, it notes that “the stewardship responsibility of  the state does not absolve other
parties . . . from their responsibilities” (para. 1.12).
3 Ibid. n. 1 above, paras 3.42–3.43.
4 The terms of  reference do not, however, make direct mention of  the state. Moreover, the corporate sector –
a non-state actor – is discussed at some length in the report, and there are also recommendations concerning
the WHO and “the international community”.
that we ought to be thinking in terms of  public health sans frontières – of  public health
“without borders”. 
By way of  illustration, consider the HIV/AIDS epidemic. This has been – is – a
devastating epidemic, and no account of  it should omit either the terrible death toll (more
than 25 million people have now died of  HIV-related causes),5 or the ways in which
government policies have added to the numbers of  dead and dying, of  orphans and child-
headed households, and of  those vulnerable to infection. To stop there, however, would
make the account incomplete; most notably, it would mean leaving out the part played by
non-state actors – from pharmaceutical companies and NGOs to organisations such as the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Clinton Foundation and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.6 In this article I shall be looking at just one of  these non-
state actors – NGOs, and in particular global human rights NGOs. I have chosen these
organisations for two reasons. First, ethical considerations are supposed to be their very
essence: to put it crudely, human rights NGOs are meant to be about making an effort to
“do good” in the world. They are, as Ong puts it, “practitioners of  humanity”.7 Secondly,
looking at the HIV/AIDS epidemic – an example I come back to again and again
throughout the article – it is clear that such efforts have had a deep, even transformative,
impact on how the illness is perceived and, relatedly, on what can and should be done to
halt its spread and bring it to an end.
Translated into the language of  the Nuffield report, we might say that via their work on
HIV/AIDS, human rights NGOs have been engaged in “stewardship on a global scale”.8
Should that prove controversial – because for example it is only the state that should be seen
in stewardship terms, or because stewardship is too problematic an idea – then the same
basic point can be made by saying that human rights NGOs seem to be doing exactly what
the Nuffield report recommends: that is to say, they are “third parties” that seek out a role
in public health, taking on responsibilities rather than shrugging them off  as obligations of
the state, and the state alone.9
Yet, when the Nuffield report refers to global stewardship, the context is not NGOs or,
indeed, HIV/AIDS or any of  the other public health problems with which human rights
NGOs have strong associations. In the report, global stewardship is an entry point for
discussing ethical and legal obligations associated with “pandemic preparedness”; in other
words, the obligations that stem from the need to tackle emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases such as SARS or virulent influenza.10 The report focuses in particular on
a quartet of  actors: states; the World Health Organization (WHO); the international
community; and pharmaceutical companies. I have no quibble with any of  these foci but,
as I have said, I believe global stewardship points in another direction too: it points towards
NGOs, and in particular towards human rights NGOs. So, with that in mind, I use this
article to establish, first, why it is that human rights NGOs have be part of  any account of
public health stewardship on a global scale and, secondly, what this means in terms of  the
ethical issues facing such organisations. Put differently, I use this article to take some first
steps towards an account of  public health sans frontières.
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2 Public health sans frontières
Let’s begin by looking more closely at the part played by NGOs in the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Recall, for instance, that during the epidemic’s earliest years it was a campaign by
ACT-UP, a US-based NGO, that changed conventions on drug-testing and licensing, and
that this in turn helped to accelerate the development of  antiretrovirals (ARVs).11 Later, at
the Doha round of  trade talks, it was the negotiating power of  NGOs (working with a
network of  emerging and less-developed economies) that helped to secure a new
configuration of  trade and human rights via agreement on what is known as the Doha
Declaration. That declaration affirmed that the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of  Intellectual Property (TRIPS)12 contains flexibilities – what Rochelle Dreyfuss
calls “wiggle room”13 – that allow member states to get around patents on medicines when
this is necessary in order to protect public health.14 It also set the scene for two further
years of  negotiation after which agreement was reached on a mechanism that gives more
flexibility to states that have insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical
sector, allowing them to bring in medicines from a foreign generic producer.15
Perhaps most notably of  all, NGOs were key players when it came to building the case
for universal access to treatment. In order to achieve this goal, NGOs fixed their attention
on both “can and should”:16 thus, they called for access to be accepted and secured as a
human right, as a global public good, but they did not stop there; they also demonstrated
that universal access was achievable – that poor people did adhere to complex drug
regimes,17 that treatment saved money as well as lives, and that the differential pricing and
generics competition that could help to make ARVs more affordable was not going to
imperil research and development (R&D) on global public health. The message reached its
intended recipients: in 2006 the international community pledged universal access to HIV
prevention, treatment, care and support — “as close as possible . . . . by 2010 for all those
who need it”18 – thereby bolstering the commitment, made in the Millennium Development
Goals, to reverse the epidemic by 2015.
The best-known NGO in the HIV/AIDS field is probably Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), an organisation founded in South Africa by a “handful of  people”19 on international
human rights day in 1998. TAC’s first campaign, launched on the same day, called on the
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South African government to implement a comprehensive national programme to prevent
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of  HIV. Achieving that goal was, however, neither
easy nor immediate. TAC had to battle the government both in and out of  court, and it had
to combine this with a range of  other initiatives, including working with the government in
order to challenge the drug-pricing practices of  major pharmaceutical companies. Along the
way, TAC encountered not just arguments in favour of  patent protection on ARVs and
other AIDS medicines, but also both AIDS denialism (and the dissident science that
supported it) and a remarkably widespread belief  that the right to health was non-justiciable.
Put differently, TAC found itself  in a “chain of  disputes”20 and, as Zackie Ahmat, a
founding member and former chairperson of  TAC, explains what was toughest of  all was
that some of  these disputes gave the organisation no option other than taking on the ANC: 
The difficult decision . . . was not to take off  my suit and go to the streets and
fight for treatment . . . That was easy. The emotionally torturous thing for me to
do was to recognize we had to take on the ANC. Our ANC.21
By taking on the ANC on a matter of  health policy, TAC compounded its problems.
Intervening in this arena brought the organisation face-to-face with the legacy of  apartheid
– an era when “health” was used “to justify, first, racial segregation measures and, later,
exploitation of  the labor force . . . [when] tuberculosis and syphilis provided a foundation
on which to construct theories of  black inferiority and African sexual promiscuity”.22 It
also brought TAC face-to-face with the appeal of  traditional medicine, and with the view –
popular amongst public health experts – that poor, ill-educated people were not going to
adhere to treatment regimes. 
Knowing this makes TAC’s achievements all the more remarkable: TAC paved the way
not only for a nationwide programme for the prevention of  MTCT but also a national ARV
treatment plan for all those with HIV/AIDS. More than this, its treatment literacy campaign
demonstrated just how wrong it was to assume that poor patients would not follow complex
drug regimes. It also delivered a new generation of  South African “biocitizens” – well-
informed and ready to engage and make demands on matters of  health policy. As of  2010,
South Africa had one million people living with HIV on treatment, the largest number
worldwide.23 The country’s government had also increased the HIV budget by 33 per cent,
and launched a campaign to test 15 million people by 2011 – a move that has been described
by the Executive Director of  UNAIDS as “the biggest national mobilization around any
single issue since the end of  apartheid and the largest HIV counselling, testing and
treatment scale-up in the history of  the HIV epidemic”.24
To sum up then: locally, nationally and at the international level, NGOs have shaped
responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. They have influenced law and policy, and in so
doing they have challenged the taken-for-granted – including both the alleged non-
justiciability of  the right to health and the assumed deadlock between the trade view of  the
world and its human rights counterpart. More than this, NGOs have redirected research and
become involved in directing it too, and they have also delivered prevention, care, treatment
and support on the ground. To achieve these ends, NGOs formed networks amongst
themselves, and they also partnered with states, international organisations and fellow non-
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state actors (including new health-oriented super-philanthropists such as the Gates
Foundation). In so doing, they helped to forge what is sometimes called “AIDS
exceptionalism”; an unprecedented conjunction of  state and non-state actors working
towards the resolution of  a public health problem, willing to consider and push ahead with
new ways of  thinking (such as the human rights approach to public health pioneered by
Jonathan Mann, the first director of  UNAIDS) and unwilling to let accepted ideas about
“effective” health delivery stand in their way. They also of  course provided a template that
others, working on different public health problems, are now very keen to follow.
What I take from this is that a report on “public health: ethical issues” that does not
engage fully with NGOs has to be seen as an incomplete report. The neglect of  NGOs is
more problematic still when we recall that the Nuffield report does not limit itself  to
engagement with the state and, moreover, that it brings the idea of  “stewardship on a global
scale” into play. In order to address that neglect, the remainder of  this article draws out a
range of  points that could be part of  a revised Nuffield report – a report that does engage
with NGOs. What follows will be nowhere near a full engagement; for example, I spend no
time examining the Nuffield Council’s understanding of  stewardship or the pros and cons
of  applying that understanding to human rights NGOs. Instead, the emphasis is on shaping
possible lines of  enquiry: the aim is to give basic form and, more importantly, impetus to
the argument that any viable account of  “public health: ethical issues” has to incorporate
NGOs – both the roles they are playing and the effects on states, on fellow non-state actors
and, of  course, on NGOs themselves. 
The latter question is the one I focus on here. In what follows I look, first, at the
relationship between human rights-based approaches to public health and their
humanitarian counterparts; then, at the commitment of  global human rights NGOs to
economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights; and third and, finally, at the challenging nature
of  what we may call “human rights triage”. 
3 Public health: ethical issues – the case of NGOs 
I begin with a possible objection: namely, that as regards NGOs and the matter of  “public
health: ethical issues” the work has already been done – mostly by NGOs themselves via
the production of  codes of  good practice. The best-known of  such codes is the one
prepared jointly by the International Federation of  Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
and the International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC): often called the Red Cross code,
its full title is “The Code of  Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief ”,25 and since
its creation in 1994 it has been signed by hundreds of  NGOs. Another increasingly well-
known example is the Sphere Project’s “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response”, which was devised in 2000 and has since had two revisions.26
These codes are now practically “industry standards”. By no stretch of  the imagination,
however, can they be seen as an ethical framework for NGO policymaking and practice in
the field of  public health. They were not, of  course, designed with that broad purpose in
mind; their focus is much narrower – disaster relief  or response. They were also crafted by
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and for humanitarian organisations, not their human rights counterparts. Still, given that
disasters have been a key site of  NGO public health work, these codes merit scrutiny here.
Indeed, if  it can be established that these codes address the ethical considerations that
confront human rights NGOs in disaster sites, then at least part of  the project to build an
account of  NGOs and “public health: ethical issues” is already complete.
Let’s start with the Red Cross code; specifically, principle 2 which states that “[a]id is
given regardless of  race, creed or nationality of  the recipients and without adverse
distinction of  any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of  need alone.” My own
reaction to this principle is akin to that of  Jennifer Rubenstein, who asks: “What precisely is
it prescribing?”27 As Rubenstein points out, the sentences that make up principle 2 – the first
foregrounding non-discrimination, the second calling for “need alone” to be determinative
– are no self-evident partnership. In particular, there is nothing about non-discrimination
that compels a needs-based approach; maximising harm reduction, for instance, might be
just as compatible with the principle of  non-discrimination. More generally, where need
exceeds aid, focusing on “need alone” will not offer decisive guidance on either the sorting
of  needs or the day-to-day selection (and thus non-selection) of  individuals.
Prioritising “most urgent need” might be an option here, but it too calls for further
scrutiny. Sorting and selection – human rights triage28 – are not going to be eliminated by
the use of  an urgency criterion; indeed, they may become more complex given that the
criterion calls for a border between urgent and less urgent need that will have to be
established and then policed. Moreover, the prior question, concerning why need (rather
than, say, maximising harm reduction) has been chosen, still has to be answered too.29
Finally, whether need or urgent need is the criterion, NGOs will still face follow-on
questions about the impact of  their interventions. For example, are their interventions
meeting need partly by luring locals to “NGOland”,30 draining the primary healthcare
system of  trained staff ? And are they also wreaking havoc on the prospects of  local (fee-
based) services?
The Sphere code is not problem-free either. To illustrate this point, let’s take a brief  look
at its emphasis on minimum standards. There is, of  course, clear affinity between that
emphasis and a human rights-based approach; minimum standards provide a threshold
below which protection should not fall, and the idea of  “minimum core obligations” has
been promoted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the
treaty body responsible for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).31 At the same time, however, and especially amidst an emergency, a
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in Barnett and Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question, n. 27 above, p. 196. 
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2011). In elaborating on principle 2, the Red Cross code states that: “Wherever possible, we will base the
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already in place to meet those needs.” (emphasis added) See also principles 6, 7, 8 and 9 of  the code.
31 An excellent account is provided by K G Young, “The minimum core of  economic and social rights: a
concept in search of  content” (2008) 33 Yale Journal of  International Law 113.
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minimum can readily become the ceiling not the floor as NGOs adjust downwards in light
of  local factors. Moreover, claims that minimum standards have to be met may encourage
“quality assurance”, whereby NGOs limit the range of  their interventions so as to boost
levels of  care and protection amongst the more select group that is being assisted. The
point I am making here is not that NGOs that confine or contextualise are indisputably
“bad” NGOs, but rather that a minimum standards approach is not always-and-everywhere
synonymous with a fully fledged rights-based one: minima draw us towards survival, a vital
goal, but in so doing they can draw us away from human dignity – including the need for
NGOs to follow a dignity-infused approach when defining and meeting the requirements
for survival.32
The Red Cross and Sphere codes present other difficulties too. Two, in particular, merit
comment here: first, these codes were designed by and for humanitarian NGOs, not their
human rights counterparts; and second, they target “disaster” rather than the full spectrum
of  public health. I think these, however, should be seen as productive difficulties; by this I
mean they are difficulties that provoke helpful lines of  enquiry. For example, they encourage
us to enquire into the kind of  NGO challenges that are produced when public health
problems are framed as “disasters” or “emergencies”. NGOs themselves are no strangers
to the logic of  emergency; they have wielded it in response to both sudden crises and
embedded or long-term ones, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic and maternal mortality. The
logic of  emergency is also wielded by states and, increasingly, by the international
community too. For the latter, emerging infectious diseases – from SARS and virulent new
forms of  influenza, to bioterrorism and both multi- and extensively drug-resistant forms of
tuberculosis – have been a particular preoccupation. Indeed, over the last decade or so,
these diseases have had a profound impact, immersing us in the need for “preparedness”,
the pull of  “action now” and the importance of  governing the “exceptional”. In so doing
they have shaped (and been shaped by) a new lexicon, one featuring not only variations on
“preparedness” but also “risk”, “resilience” and various takes on “security”, including
“biosecurity”, “human security” and what the World Health Organization (WHO) calls
“global public health security”.33
This makes for difficult terrain for human rights NGOs engaged in public health work.
Looking first at the new lexicon, it is only human security that has overt human rights
resonance;34 by contrast, the other terms, and more generally the construction of  particular
public-health problems as emergencies, can make it difficult for human rights claims to get
a fair hearing.35 Second, attacking the logic of  emergency is no plain and simple option for
human rights NGOs. For all that it is misleading, this logic is not an out-and-out lie: the
globalised world does have emerging epidemics and it does make sense for these to be of
international concern. NGOs also have their own reasons for endorsing the logic of
emergency. For example, they have been offered a “seat-at-the-table” by the revised
Public health sans frontières: human rights NGOs and “stewardship”
32 On dignity, survival and the minimum core, see generally M Salomon, “Why should it matter that others have
more? Poverty, inequality and the potential of  international human rights law”, available at
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2010-15-Salomon.pdf  (accessed 1 September 2011). 
33 WHO, The World Health Report 2007: A safer future – global public health security in the 21st century (Geneva: WHO
2007). For discussion of  the lexicon’s terms, see T Murphy and N Whitty, “Is human rights prepared? Risk,
rights and public health emergencies” (2009) 19 Medical Law Review 219, available at
http://medlaw.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/2/219.short (accessed 1 September 2011). 
34 See Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security 2003).
35 See W Parmet, Public Health and Social Control: Implications for human rights (Geneva: International Council on
Human Rights Policy 2009), available at www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/public_health_and_social_control_
wendy_parmet.pdf  (accessed 1 September 2011).
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International Health Regulations (IHR), which allow the WHO to use information about
disease outbreaks provided by unofficial (that is, non-state) sources.36
In practice, specialist public health surveillance networks and institutions (such as
GOARN,37 which was established by WHO itself) are far more likely than NGOs to be in a
position to provide relevant information on outbreaks. Nonetheless the underlying shift away
from states as the sole voice on public health matters does help to establish the legitimacy of
non-state perspectives, including, of  course, those of  human rights NGOs. More generally,
rising global interest in public health emergencies, of  which the revised IHR are one sign,
offers NGOs a means by which they may be able to lift particular public health problems
from a state of  neglect to the resource-rich international stage; a means perhaps to emulate
the widely envied success of  the HIV/AIDS campaign for universal access to treatment. 
The problem, of  course, is that the logic of  public health emergency is also misleading.
For starters, its focus on emerging epidemics – on the future – may be exacerbating neglect
of  people who are dying today of  public health problems, such as maternal mortality, that
are entirely solvable. Second, the logic of  emergency pitches public health together with
security, protection with policing, disaster with crime – a matrix that is likely to favour
criminal law-focused approaches and solutions to public health problems. And, thirdly, in
the logic of  public health emergency, drugs are dominant. Today’s public health
emergencies are “drug emergencies”; the underlying determinants of  the public’s health –
including sanitation, water and the quality of  the primary health infrastructure – lag a long
way behind. Immediate access to drugs can, of  course, be life-saving: a sudden outbreak of
cholera clearly is a public health emergency that is a drug emergency. Nevertheless, as I
explain below, the equation “public health = drugs” – what others have called “the
pharmaceuticalisation of  public health”38 – has its downsides too.
huMaN rIGhTs, huMaNITarIaNIsM aNd “huMaN rIGhTs-LITe”
At this juncture, let’s go back to the other difficulty arising from the Sphere and Red Cross
codes: namely, that these codes were developed by and for humanitarian NGOs, rather than
their human rights counterparts. The reason I see this difficulty as productive, or helpful, is
that it directs attention towards the relationship between humanitarianism and human rights.
In so doing it encourages us to ask: in what ways, and with what effects, are humanitarianism
and human rights connecting and disconnecting in the field of  public health, in particular
amidst rising interest in ESC rights on the part of  human rights NGOs?39
The NGO world is clearly one of  the places we can look to answer that question. And
if, within that world, we look at the Sphere code, a code produced by and for humanitarian
NGOs, we find quite considerable use of  the language of  human rights. More tellingly, the
Nobel Prize-winning and avowedly humanitarian NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
has become involved in both the provision of  HIV/AIDS treatment and a campaign on
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Global Pharmaceuticals: Ethics, markets, practices (Durham NC: Duke UP 2006).
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humanitarian law in the context of  armed conflict, in particular the “convergence” thesis, may well be pertinent
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access to essential medicines, which includes the funding and management of  R&D on new
drugs. In so doing, MSF does not appear to have made any public shift towards human
rights; in fact, as Peter Redfield points out, at MSF there seems to be “continued avoidance
of  human rights rhetoric”.40 Yet, as Redfield goes on to explain, it is hard to see how either
the provision of  HIV/AIDS treatment or advocacy and research on essential medicines can
claim to be conventionally humanitarian; they are, frankly, far more akin to a rights-based
approach.41 More than this, given that HIV/AIDS treatment – to be successful – requires
more than access to medicines, these initiatives may draw MSF deep into human rights
terrain, taking it well beyond the claim of  universal access to treatment. The reason for this
is simple: treatment may save lives, it may even be “one of  the most potent prevention tools
we have”,42 but people do not live on treatment alone. Moreover, if  there is a shortage of
transport to and from the health centre, or a lack of  clean water, even the offer of  free
treatment will be compromised. 
MSF’s drug initiatives could pan out differently, however. In particular, they could pull
the organisation towards what we may call “human rights lite”.43 The initiatives could, for
example, tighten the grip of  pharmaceuticalisation, entrenching the drug emergency as the
core way in which state and non-state actors alike think about public health. More to the
point, MSF is by no means the only actor on this particular frontier. Today, looking at the
HIV/AIDS epidemic – widely regarded as an NGO success story and, more broadly, a
human rights one – it is clear that the centrality of  treatment and testing can encourage a
shrunken sense of  what it is to take a rights-based approach. Universal access to treatment
is, to be sure, a vitally important goal. But as emphasised earlier, programmes of  treatment
and voluntary testing cannot be the sum of  a rights-based approach. If  people are to avail
themselves of  services, and if  they are to be able to use them on a long-term basis,
programmes that attack stigma, discrimination, violence and all of  the other barriers that
prevent people from coming forward, or from continuing with treatment, need to be
committed to as well. To put that more succinctly, rights-based approaches to public health
“comprise more than packages of  goods and services”.44
Treatment and testing are crucial, but standing alone they are human rights-lite.45 In
addition, although mobilisation around universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment is one of
the forces that helped to forge interest in global health policy, it has also intensified the
grip of  disease-specific programming. The problem with this, as Meier and Fox have pointed
out, is that when priority is given to vertical interventions directed at particular diseases,
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40 P Redfield, “Doctors without borders and the moral economy of  pharmaceuticals” in A Bullard (ed.), Human
Rights in Crisis (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008), pp. 139–40.
41 MSF’s human rights-inflected humanitarianism is not the only new configuration in the human
rights/humanitarian relationship in the field of  public health; there is also what might be described as
humanitarian-inflected human rights. On the latter, see e.g. M Ticktin, “Medical humanitarianism in and
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globalization and security, 1850 to the present (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), p. 116.
42 Sidibé, Delivering Results, n. 24 above, p. 2.
43 See relatedly A M Klasing, P S Moses and M Satterthwhaite, “Measuring the way forward in Haiti: grounding
disaster relief  in the legal framework of  human rights” (2011) 13 Health and Human Rights 1, available at
www.journal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/408/610 (accessed 1 September 2011). 
44 A E Yamin, “Will we take suffering seriously? Reflections on what applying a human rights framework to
health means and why we should care” (2008) 10 Health and Human Rights 45, p. 48, available at
www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/27/89 (accessed 1 September 2011).
45 See, relatedly, the idea of  “biological citizenship” as developed by e.g. J Biehl, Will to Live: AIDS therapies and
the politics of  survival (Princeton: Princeton UP 2007); A Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological citizens after Chernobyl
(Princeton: Princeton UP 2002).
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primary health-care systems focused on the underlying determinants of  public health tend
to be neglected.46
Moreover, NGOs play a very real part in this form of  prioritisation, both because they
champion particular diseases and because donors, looking for the best way to spend their
money, may prefer to fund NGO provision rather than pursue the riskier strategy of
giving to individual states in support of  a considerably looser goal such as sector-wide
health investment.47
The LIMITs Of huMaN rIGhTs NGOs
MSF, as noted earlier, is a past winner of  the Nobel Peace Prize. It is not, however, the only
Peace Prize recipient amongst NGOs: in 1997 the prize went to Jody Williams and the cluster
of  NGOs that had come together to form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.48
One of  those sharing that prize was Human Rights Watch (HRW), widely seen as the
archetypal global human rights NGO. In recent years, both HRW and, its fellow global giant,
Amnesty International have broadened out from their classic focus on civil and political
rights, extending their remits so that they now include ESC rights. Amnesty explains the
change of  focus in the following way: 
Amnesty International has broadened its mission in recognition that there are
many more prisoners of  poverty than prisoners of  conscience, and that millions
endure the torture of  hunger and slow death from preventable disease.49
And for HRW, according to the history pages on its website, it was the HIV/
AIDS epidemic that led the organisation to develop a programme devoted to human rights
and health.50
Yet there have been demands for these NGOs to do still more; most notably from
Paul Hunt, the first UN special rapporteur on the right to health, who argued that “civil
society within the health and human rights movement could and should be doing much
more”, and that established NGOs should be working on health and human rights issues
“just as vigorously as they already campaign on disappearances, torture and prisoners of
conscience”.51 Kenneth Roth of  HRW sees things differently, however.52 Roth has
argued that:
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index.php/hhr/article/view/203/298 (accessed 1 September 2011).
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48 www.icbl.org (accessed 1 September 2011). Their work helped forge the Convention on the Prohibition of  the
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49 Amnesty International, Human Rights for Human Dignity: A primer on economic, social and cultural rights (London:
Amnesty International 2005), p.4.
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51 “Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the right of  everyone to the enjoyment of  the highest attainable
standard of  physical and mental health, Paul Hunt”, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/28 (17 January 2007), para. 37.
52 K Roth, “Defending economic, social, and cultural rights: practical issues faced by an international human
rights organization” in D A Bell and J-M Coicaud (eds), Ethics in Action: The ethical challenges of  international
human rights nongovernmental organizations (New York: CUP 2007), p. 169. See relatedly S Hopgood, “Dignity and
ennui” (2010) 2 Journal of  Human Rights Practice 151.
when outsiders ask international human rights organizations such as Human
Rights Watch to expand our work on ESC rights, we should insist on a more
sophisticated, and realistic, conversation than has been typical so far.53
He says that, in his experience, advice to international human rights NGOs to “do
more” to protect ESC rights has tended to be “little more than sloganeering”.54 In
particular, he says, “it . . . ignores the question of  which issues can and cannot effectively
be taken up by international human rights organizations that rely on shaming to generate
public pressure”.55
HRW, Roth’s own organisation, is well known for its use of  a shaming methodology.
Roth’s core claim is that, if  this methodology is to be effective, there has to be clarity on
three fundamentals: the violation, the violator and the remedy. He maintains that “[i]f  any
of  these three elements is missing, the capacity to shame is greatly diminished”.56 The
difficulty with ESC rights, of  course, is that this clarity can be hard to achieve: responsibility
tends to be multiple not singular, and the question of  what would be an appropriate remedy
is often disputed. The upshot, according to Roth, is that HRW’s shaming methodology
simply does not work for violations of  ESC rights bar in that subset of  cases where it is
possible to pinpoint arbitrary or discriminatory conduct that is causing, or substantially
contributing to, the violation:
[I]f  all an international human rights organization can do is argue that more
money be spent to uphold an ESC right – that a fixed economic pie be divided
differently – our voice is relatively weak . . . On the other hand, if  we can show
that the government (or other relevant actor) is contributing to an ESC shortfall
through arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, we are in a relatively powerful
position to shame: we can show a violation (the rights shortfall), the violator (the
government or other actor, through its arbitrary or discriminatory conduct), and
the remedy (reversing that conduct).57
There is more detail in Roth’s account but let’s see how these basics might measure up
in an ethics test. We should begin by acknowledging that there is more than one way of
doing good in the world, and indeed that this is a good thing; “cookie-cutter” NGOs would
not be attractive or useful. It is also important to acknowledge that we are not dealing with
a “blank slate”:58 HRW has a history, which means that members and contributors alike
have particular expectations and this in turn means that veering too far from those
expectations might be akin to hitting a self-destruct button. Because of  its history, HRW
also has a specific expertise; expertise that might not be so useful in the field of  public
health or health rights more generally. 
On the other hand, though, HRW is no ordinary NGO. It is, indisputably, a gatekeeper
NGO – issues that are taken up by it are a great deal more likely to gain a global audience,
and that in turn brings funding and other forms of  momentum too. Moreover, for all that
there is no blank slate, the priority that HRW gives to shaming is surprising at a time when
human rights method is a growth area, as evidenced, for example, by expanding interest in
Public health sans frontières: human rights NGOs and “stewardship”
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54 Ibid. p. 170.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. p. 173.
57 Ibid. p. 174.
58 J H Carens, “The problem of  doing good in a world that isn’t: reflections on the ethical challenges facing
INGOs” in Bell and Coicaud, Ethics in Action, n. 52 above, p. 260.
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impact assessment, indicators and human rights budgeting,59 and by the use of
quantitative methods as a prosecution tool at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.60
To be clear: I am not suggesting that HRW should abandon its shaming methodologies,
that newer human rights methods are better or, indeed, that Roth is wrong when he says
that responsibility for violation of  ESC rights is often multiple. The claim instead is that
gatekeeper NGOs, precisely because they are gatekeepers, should be seen as having
particular responsibilities. Where a gatekeeper NGO frames shortcomings in ESC rights as,
by and large, outside its remit – where it frames such shortcomings as mostly “matters of
pure distributive justice”61 – it sends a message about what is, and what is not, a human
rights matter. In so doing, it may cause harm to the standing of  ESC rights both as a prompt
for claims-making and as a component part of  the law.62 And that in turn increases the risk
that these rights will be thrown back onto a frame dominated by the language of  needs, and
of  the deserving and undeserving. It also threatens the progress that has been made towards
treating ESC rights as rights “proper” rather than, say, directive principles, and it offers less
than fulsome support to the position of  the CESCR which sees “all members of  society”
as possessing certain “responsibilities regarding the realization of  the right to health”.63
Other harms could follow too, not least more limited openings for solidarity between
gatekeeper NGOs and their local and national counterparts and also, crucially, less room for
manoeuvre for the latter.64
It seems to me that mindset, not methodology, may be the main obstacle. HRW has in
fact been able to engage with a range of  public health problems in recent years, from
disasters and displaced populations to sexual and reproductive health.65 There are also
several new openings for the organisation’s preferred shaming methodology, both in the
field of  ESC rights in general and in public health in particular. To start with, ESC rights
are now guaranteed in a significant number of  constitutions and, as we saw earlier, at least
one NGO, South Africa’s TAC, has used a constitutional guarantee of  the right to have
access to health-care services66 as part of  its successful campaigning on public health
matters. Another opening is provided by the new optional protocol to the ICESCR67 which,
when it enters into force, will allow CESCR to receive and consider individual complaints
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concerning alleged violations of  Covenant rights. And, as Roth himself  seems to
recognise,68 the human rights responsibility of  international co-operation and assistance
could be used to produce a third opening.69 As pointed out by the first UN special
rapporteur on the right to health, the “contours, content and legal nature”70 of  this
responsibility need to be spelled out more clearly. The special rapporteur’s own report on
the matter uses Sweden as a case study, praising the country as a model high-income state
– “[f]rom a right-to-health perspective . . . its international policies on development, health
and human rights are among the best in the world”71 – but noting that even this “model”
state does not accept that it has a legal obligation of  international assistance and co-
operation. Furthermore, even though both the special rapporteur and CESCR72 have
emphasised that there is such an obligation, the stance taken by Sweden is by no means
unique – rather, it is widespread amongst high-income states, which surely points to the
importance of  further human rights NGO advocacy on this issue. 
The timing might be right too, in that rising interest in emerging infectious diseases –
what WHO calls “global public health security” – may provide an opportunity to press
claims for international assistance and co-operation. The revised IHR, for example, are
premised on global interconnectedness. And the Nuffield report seems to draw on the same
theme when it recommends applications of  its preferred stewardship model “at the global
level” or “on a global scale”.73 Thus the report calls for compliance with the disease-
notification requirements in the revised IHR, emphasising that “countries have an ethical
obligation to reduce the risk of  ill health that people might impose on each other across
borders”.74 It also calls on wealthy states to help improve “the capacities of  developing
countries to conduct effective surveillance of  infectious diseases”; and it encourages
“WHO, the international community and pharmaceutical companies” to build on existing
pledges to improve manufacturing capacity for flu vaccines in developing countries.75
Of  course, all of  these recommendations for global-level stewardship fit with what I
described earlier as the logic of  public health emergency; thus, they focus on emerging
infectious diseases (as opposed to present-day killers or basic survival needs) and they give
centre-stage to surveillance and drugs. Still, given that the emphasis on “security” helped to
forge the human-rights-friendly concept of  “human security”, it is surely possible that the
idea of  “stewardship ‘on a global scale’”, or indeed “global public health security”, given
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74 Ibid. para. 4.50.
75 Nuffield report, n. 1 above, paras 4.50, 4.68.
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their preoccupation with global interconnectedness, could in turn provide a way in for
advocacy on the human rights responsibility of  international assistance and co-operation.
save The wOrLd?
Others may take a harder line on HRW-type arguments about what is, and is not, an
appropriate project for global human rights NGOs. For example, the philosopher Thomas
Pogge has made the exceptionally strong claim that “even a project that does more good
than harm should be abandoned when a lot more net good can be achieved with the same
resources elsewhere”.76 The first point to make about this claim is that engaging with it is
not easy. As I said earlier, human rights NGOs are widely seen as making an effort to do
good in the world and that fact alone makes Pogge’s critique difficult, even indecent. Pogge
himself  says that the standard he sets is sure to prove “inadequate in various ways”.77 But
the problem seems to run far deeper: how precisely does one critique “good practice”, and
is it wrong even to try?
Perhaps it is for one or both of  these reasons that NGOs, by and large, refrain from
criticising one another. Moreover, calling for auto-critique – for NGOs to engage in self-
scrutiny – is not problem-free either. Self-scrutiny may now be standard practice for NGOs
– demanded by donors, expected by supporters and embraced by NGOs themselves as a
way to assess whether and how desired outcomes are being achieved78 – but scrutiny on
ethics seems to be of  a different order. There are at least four reasons for this. First, inside
individual NGOs the view from the field tends to differ from that in head office, especially
on the question of  human rights triage. Logical or principled choices about selection and
non-selection generally feel less logical and less principled when one is face-to-face with the
people who are going to be affected in profound ways by these choices. As Redfield has
pointed out, from a local perspective, “the end of  engagement is less clearly justifiable, and
appears akin to abandonment or sacrifice of  that population”.79 What I take from this is
that, if  not handled with extreme care, auto-critique on the ethics of  human rights triage
could rupture the organisational culture of  individual NGOs.
Second, not all publicity is good publicity and encouraging human rights NGOs to go
public on how they handle difficult ethical issues could have damaging repercussions.80 We
tend to think of  human rights NGOs as actors who target others; in so doing we sometimes
forget that NGOs can be targets too. We forget that they have no immunity against
manipulation or, indeed, direct attacks on their personnel or the goods they provide. NGOs
also face both hostility and scepticism; indeed, as the profile of  human rights NGOs has
risen in recent years, so too has the criticism they face. In some ways this is fair enough:
NGO transparency and accountability are important matters.81 There are critics who seek
far more than this, however; critics who do not want human rights NGOs to survive
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scrutiny. Being transparent about human rights triage is not, then, straightforward – there
are high stakes for NGOs, for their staff  members who stay behind when other
internationals have moved on, for locals who have worked with the NGO, and of  course
for others too who are left behind.82
Third, NGOs are not, or not only, lone operators. Choosing a particular course of
action, continuing with it and pulling out are actions where NGOs are influenced in part by
donor sentiments. Moreover, NGOs today tend to seek out connections with one another;
they may also be connected to international organisations, states and fellow non-state
actors. TAC, for example, has worked with ACT-UP and COSATU (a South African trade
union) amongst others. Similarly, MSF, an NGO that has been tenacious in protecting its
own autonomy (including its right to bear witness to human rights violations, and to pull
out of  projects), opted to work with TAC and a range of  other organisations as part of  an
access to medicines campaign. The point here is not that being in a network, or being in
partnership, dissolves the need to consider ethics; simply, that it is likely to make their
consideration and pursuit a good deal more difficult.
Fourth and finally, ethical considerations are not resource-neutral: resources spent on
ethics are resources that are not being spent elsewhere – NGOs are not resource-rich
enough for it to be any other way. Take, for example, participation: amongst human rights
NGOs, participation by beneficiaries is widely seen as both an ethical imperative and a
means of  improving the likely effectiveness of  a project. Yet resources spent on training
NGO staff  in modes of  participation are resources that could have been spent in other
ways.83 And, although at first glance this may seem a foolish example (after all, why be
against participation?), the rise of  a new accountability culture amongst NGOs could
produce an excess of  posts in this arena (as well as “the ‘bureaucratic personalities’” that
these positions sometimes encourage).84
Still, even with these problems Pogge’s argument should not be dismissed out of  hand.
For starters, although we may want to insist that there is more than one way of  doing good,
there still has to be a way to identify NGOs that do harm. Put differently, even if  agreement
on what is good is unlikely, we can – and must  – look for agreement on what is unarguably
wrong. The phenomenon of  “servile NGOs”85 (that is, organisations that are government-
sponsored and focused on serving a state interest, not a public one) makes this an important
task. Interestingly, even the limited consideration of  NGOs in the Nuffield report picks up
on this point, noting that:
[a]lthough NGOs are often perceived as acting “for the good of  the public” and
therefore as more trustworthy than officialdom, it should be borne in mind that
NGOs may have a vested interest, a commercial imperative and a “product” in a
way that it not dissimilar to a business. Some may be sponsored by a commercial
company with an interest or agenda in this area. An organisation that campaigns
on behalf  of  a sector of  the public with a particular kind of  worry may even rely
for its support on that worry being amplified and even distorted.86
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Money, of  course, is one area where NGOs have been willing to be critical of  one
another. Fundraising practices have been their principal target,87 but what if  we were to
stretch the trend so as to look at other NGO practices concerning money? One question
that comes immediately to mind is: given that human rights activism is often seen as a
vocation, that volunteerism is prized, who should be paid for their work? For instance, is
paying community health workers for the work they do on behalf  of  their neighbours, a
vital element in the achievement of  health and human rights goals or is it, as some would
argue, an unsustainable practice?88 And, as mentioned earlier, what are the ethical
responsibilities of  NGOs when their work creates “a local brain drain by luring nurses,
doctors, and other professionals from the public hospitals . . . to ‘NGOland,’ where salaries
are better and the tools of  [the] trade more plentiful”?89 Also, shifting ground a little, what
about NGO interns – the recent graduates who have been declared winners in the fierce
competition for short-term, unpaid appointments? I know from the classes I teach that, for
human rights students, few jobs have more appeal, but what exactly are the ethical
responsibilities of  NGOs towards this unpaid workforce?90
Of  course, what matters to Pogge is something different. His concern is project
selection91 by international NGOs, and in particular what he sees as the imperative to do
more good rather than less. Assuming an NGO accepts this imperative, following through
is not always going to be practicable: in choosing between projects, an NGO has to take
account of  more than what will do most good – its mission, for example, is also relevant to
the calculation. The NGO may also be faced with insufficient information to allow it to
complete a proper ranking as between the different choices. 
Still, even with these caveats, Pogge’s imperative presents global NGOs with at least one
compelling challenge: namely, to explain why they choose to “save the world” when they
might be more effective – when they might do more good – if  they were to apply limits to
the geographic scope of  their work.92 HRW, for example, is engaged in research and
advocacy in around 90 countries.93 Would it object to a contraction of  the geographic scope
of  its efforts? If  so, on what basis? As Joseph Carens has noted, “[i]t would be instructive
to learn whether [NGOs such as HRW] think there is a deep, principled reason for the
choices they make or whether it is a response to fund-raising or other imperatives”.94
4 Conclusion
I close with an anecdote drawn from teaching human rights courses over a good number of
years. The students in my classes are almost always interested in the relationship between
academia and activism; at the same time, however, because many of  them imagine their
human-rights future working “in the field” (or perhaps at a headquarters in New York,
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91 Carens, “The problem of  doing good”, n. 58 above, p. 270 makes this point, noting that choices about mission
or basic strategy are, by contrast, “characterized by a much higher degree of  uncertainty than Pogge allows
for . . . although no one can doubt the wisdom of  a general prescription that says do more good rather than
less, other things being equal, it is often impossible to tell what will do more good” (p. 267).
92 Ibid. pp. 270–1.
93 Gorvin, “Producing the evidence”, n. 78 above, p. 479.
94 Carens, “The problem of  doing good”, n. 58 above, p. 271.
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London, Geneva or elsewhere), they will often ask why anyone wanting to do human rights
would choose to be an academic not an activist. Viewed from a teaching perspective it is an
excellent question. But, if  I am honest, it is vexing too: it seems to suggest that this choice
– the choice of  what to be in human rights – is the crucial one. It is, of  course, an important
choice, one that will have consequences both for the individual making it and for the future
of  human rights. Yet choice does not end at this point: life as an academic involves choice,
and choice is also part and parcel of  human rights activism. Indeed, in the activists’ world,
choice can be both relentless and oppressive; it can also be a matter of  life and death – for
activists themselves and for others too. Put simply, choice is abundant in the activists’ world.
That in a way is what motivated this article. True, the article itself  engages with just one
context – public health – wherein NGOs face choices: choices that are important for them,
for other public health actors and, of  course, for the rest of  us too. The article proposes
that wider recognition and debate concerning such choices would be a good thing –
though it will be precarious too. More specifically, the article proposes a revised Nuffield
report; a report that is more fully engaged with the phenomenon I have labelled “public
health sans frontières”. 
Were there to be such a report, I would like it to include the following. First, the
relationship between human rights and humanitarianism in the public health arena, and
perhaps more broadly too (say, in relation to the government of  war and armed conflict).
Second, the commitment of  global human rights NGOs to public health issues, and the
extent to which we ought to be concerned both about the scope of  such commitments and
about the form that they take. Third, the particular challenges of  human rights triage: what are
those challenges, and in what ways are they genuinely distinctive to human rights (because
of  its commitments, say, or perhaps because of  its practices)? Does human rights need a set
of  ethics95 to handle such challenges or just a more thorough and more open engagement
both with extant principles, such as participation and non-discrimination, and with extant
health and human rights practices, such as those of  South Africa’s TAC? And, finally, I have
also emphasised that global health security has to be part of  the backdrop to any such
discussion, not least because this new preoccupation is already producing both challenges
and opportunities for human rights NGOs who work in the field of  public health. 
Public health sans frontières: human rights NGOs and “stewardship”
95 P Gready, “Introduction: responsibility to the story” (2010) 2 Journal of  Human Rights Practice 177, p. 189,
proposes an “enabling ethics” – albeit in a different, non-public health context.
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